Roland Barthes: Part Two - Myth & Meaning in the Era of the Internet

The New 'Myth Today'

(This paper is part of our series on Structuralism and Post Structuralism, click here to be redirected to the first paper in the series: the works of Ferdinand De Saussure)

While Barthes original works were charged with Marxist emancipatory fervor, his later writings presented the deciphering of myth as an activity of pleasure and not truly an endeavor that served to liberate humanity by being critical of ideological power structures and the operation of myth in society. Barthes would go so far to assert that there was no ‘secret science’ to be revealed; that the activity of de-mythologizing mythology would reveal that de-mythology itself is but another mythology. Barthes would claim that these mythologies were open to various interpretations, and that the public would be able to distinguish between what is objectively denoted, and what is mythically connoted.  

However, the semiotic analysis of myth – de-mythology – provides us with a framework to understand and conceptualise the use of myth in contemporary society; a form of myth entirely different from that of Barthes’ day. One of Barthes' famous essays from amongst his later writings was titled "Myth Today" (Barthes, 1972), in which he expresses this perception of de-mythology. In this paper, we set out a new 'Myth Today', updated for the contemporary age. Today, mythic signs saturate every level of society and are deliberately designed and nuanced to resonate with the emotional side of the audience rather than the rational. It is far more difficult for the individual to resist mythologies that are curated specifically for them. Advertising and political campaigns have taken this very science of semiotics and semiology that Saussure and Barthes developed and deployed it in the construction of powerful myths, effectively turning ‘de-mythology’ into ‘re-mythology’ – the use of semiotic understandings to develop and nurture semiotic systems.  

In his book Mindf*ck (2019), Christopher Wylie, the Cambridge Analytica Whistleblower explains that;

The United States has its own origin myths, its own extremist groups… I knew that if we were going to truly study America, we needed to do it as if we were studying tribal conflict – by mapping out the country’s rituals, superstitions, mythologies and ethnic tensions. 

This motivation was driven by the use of technology far removed from what was available during Barthes’ day – digital psychographic microtargeting; developing and curating particular mythologies for particular audiences down to the individual level, where the mythic message was designed to resonate with the specific anxieties, tensions, and fears of the audience. These technologies harness machine learning algorithms in order to process thousands of data points on each individual user so that messaging targeting that user can be designed to specifically resonate with them on such an individual level.  

For example, in a demonstration of Cambridge Analytica’s capabilities, then-CEO Alexander Nix, presenting at the Concordia Summit in 2016 (a lifetime ago in terms of the development of these technologies and their capabilities), demonstrated how a single message targeting different audiences could be algorithmically loaded with the necessary mythic signs relevant to the individual user and the semiotic systems they engage in. Based on their psychographic analysis of a specific population using psychological models like the OCEAN Model (also known as the Big Five Personality model or the Five Factor Personality Model), Nix shows how they were able to segment the population according to their psychological traits, as identified by the model. This model analyses an individual according to: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (OCEAN). Once the population was segmented psychographically, they were then able to use machine learning algorithms to nuance particular messaging for those users.  

Alexander Nix at the 2016 Concordia Summit

Largely, the population was segmented between two audiences; one that tested high for agreeableness and low for openness, and another which tested high for neuroticism and conscientiousness. The first group was recognized as people who value habit and tradition; low scores for openness (willingness to try new things) are considered ‘closed’ people, these types of individuals are people of habit. High levels of agreeableness (agree with other people; tend do things if those around them are doing it too) are associated with a value for tradition and community. Collectively, these factors indicate a conservative population who favour tradition and habit. Conversely, the second group (high for neuroticism and conscientiousness), indicate a group of individuals who value responsibility and security. These could be career people pursuing their ambitions, individuals who have moved out of the family home and who value security, while also being prone to anxiety and fearfulness.   

Nix takes the issue of the Second Amendment, the right to bear arms (which is a significant voting point in American politics), and demonstrates how their machine learning interfaces are able to nuance messaging around this issue for these specific types of individuals. The messaging that goes to the first group (value for tradition) is instantly nuanced to reflect those values; from the literal messaging to the mythic messaging. The article uses nostalgia to convey this value for tradition; it speaks of fathers and sons, and the bonds built between learning to wield a gun together. It uses warm colours in the images featured; like orange and yellow, to help develop this sense of nostalgia and tradition. These colours and images are forms of mythic speech; intended to convey a mythology greater than what the image denotes.  

The messaging that goes to the second group (value for security), uses harsher fonts, colder colours (blue, grey), images of shattered glass and a hand reaching through the window. All collectively trying to provoke anxiety and signify a mythology of fear and violence; which necessitates owning a gun in order to protect oneself. The article itself claims that owning a gun is a type of personal insurance policy; once again echoing mythic signifiers associated with a semiotic system relevant to professional career people.    

In this demonstration (from almost a decade ago), Nix showed how artifical intelligence and machine learning were able to nuance messaging according to the relevant mythic signs and semiotic systems that the individuals are predicted to respond to. This is dramatically different from the versions of mythic speech confronting Barthes. This type of myth is far harder to read through; and combines varying psychological and sociological sciences in the development of its messaging. 

Heuristic studies were championed with the aim of designing mythic content that would bypass the rational-mind and target the emotional vulnerabilities of the audience; effectively, the field of heuristics refers to the mental ‘shortcuts’ we engage in to arrive at conclusions, make decisions and develop assumptions – these are not necessarily erroneous, but they are imperfect, and can lead to distortions in understanding and interpretation, and are often fueled by emotion rather than rationality.  

Given this psychographic context for the production, reproduction and distribution of myth, we have seen modern myths transform into a far more powerful forms; from slogans like ‘Make America Great Again’ and ‘Radical Economic Transformation’; to dangerous theories like ‘White Monopoly Capital’, ‘The Great Replacement Theory’, ‘Plan-demic’ and the ‘QAnon’ web of conspiracies. These discourses are often developed, fueled and circulated by the work of think-tanks and public-relations firms; from think-tanks like the Heritage Institute to firms like Cambridge Analytica and Bell Pottinger. 

Mythic ‘speech’ is evident in the red beret and red overalls worn by Julius Malema - signifying a militant fighter and a member of the labourer class. Mythic speech is evident in the 'everyman' representations used by populist figures like Donald Trump and Elon Musk. These exist as symbolic gestures to their followers. 

This ‘pageantry’ mirrors Barthes’ discussion of professional wrestlers and the drama they engage in. The audiences of professional wrestling are aware that they are witnessing a staged conflict, not an actual competitive sport; similarly, these political audiences are aware that figures like Donald Trump, Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema are not members of the working-class, yet they saturate themselves with working-class and common-man significations, enough to identify with and embolden their supporters through mythic speech that targets their emotions,

Mythic ‘speech’ is similarly evident in the ‘QAnon’ connotations Donald Trump imbues his words with; from tweets to speeches at rallies, even using audio from the track ‘Where We Go One We Go All’ at a rally event. This is a known QAnon phrase that has been made into an anthem. Ever since, a myriad of posts by Trump (and now Elon Musk) feature many QAnon phrases and symbols.  

Myth today has seen an overwhelming level of growth in power and scope, defying Barthes’ expectations about humankind’s ability to read the mythic connotations in political and advertising ‘speech’. In Plato’s Republic, Plato’s mentor Socrates calls for the banning of poets from the Republic; Socrates says that poetry nourishes the lower impulses rather than drying them up; more specifically, he meant the forms of poetry and drama that played on the emotions, which as Barthes’ also identified in his essays on wrestling and consumer advertising, are powerful at communicating to the emotional responses and impulses rather than rational logic.

Myth-makers today have a far more influential stage for their dramas than the poets of ancient Greece: the internet. The internet is the ideal platform for these discourses to thrive; news websites, YouTube, podcasts, social-media apps, image-sharing sites and online forums provide large and often interconnected networks for these ideas to circulate and thrive. At the same time, these networks provide a mass amount of user-data to be measured, interpreted and harnessed which can be used to better nuance the myth-making process. 

The darkest of these mythologies are the ones that motivate acts of violence. Online echo chambers perpetuating violent mythologies like the White Genocide and the Great Replacement have been at the centre of mass shooter incidents. These forums, and the semiotic systems relevant to its users, have been cited as key influences in the radicalization of these individuals. From particular appropriations of history – like the veneration of the Roman Empire, the Knights Templar, and the glorification of the Crusader period, as well as those particular wars or incidents featuring violence between the Christian and Muslim world (as we saw in Part One, emblazoned accross the weaponry of Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch killer, and Payton Gendron, the Buffalo shooter).  

These historical periods or historical events are appropriated and distorted into the mythic versions that disseminate within these echo chambers; from memes to documented accounts of history taken from questionable sources, these narratives circulate within these echo chambers and become central elements of these semiotic systems. These mythic signifiers become so potent that they overwhelm, consume and replace the initial meaning of the sign.  

Many of the memes circulated within these groups begin with particular sets of meaning that becomes altered and changed over time. Example, Pepe the Frog began as a meme shared across 4chan; it rose in popularity as regular users began using Pepe to self-identify with. Over time, Pepe became a rallying point and symbolic identifier for far-right and extremist ideologies; eventually erupting into the mainstage when Donald Trump tweeted an image of himself as Pepe. Pepe’s origin as a character from a cartoon strip was far removed from the mythology that Pepe came to signify; one of intolerance, violence, and racism.  

Man wearing Pepe the Frog mask at a rally; also performing the 'white power' hang gesture which itself was a meme that began on 4chan

The Gamergate logo; featuring green and purple branding - mythic signifiers signifying a hidden rape joke

Vivian James, the Gamergate mascot

Similarly, through the Gamergate movement, the use of the colours purple and green became signifiers of rape and sexual violence. Beginning with a meme known as ‘the Daily Dose’ which featured characters from the popular anime show Dragon Ball Z engaged in acts of sexual violence. The image depicted the character Piccolo (who’s skin is green and purple) raping the character, Vegeta. This meme became so popular that users began regularly sharing it, which eventually led moderators on 4chan to begin removing the image from their boards. As a result, users began adjusting and adapting the image into varying forms; these adapted versions contained certain common elements – like the colours purple and green (representative of the character Piccolo), and other suggestive elements either connoting rape or referencing a medically prescribed dosage. These colour combinations – and the mythic meaning they connoted (i.e. rape) - became coopted into the Gamergate movement; where it was used as the branding for the movement – from the logo to the mascot, ‘Vivian James’. Importantly, Gamergate was an online internet movement characterized by a series of attacks on female figures in video-game journalism; making the rape-meme central to its mythology a violent and dehumanizing point to identify around.   

While studies of radicalization vary in their attempts to understand these processes and identify the influence of outside factors beyond the online rhetoric engaged in, the mythologizing of violence into memes provides a basis that is echoed in many studies into pipelines of influence and pathways to radicalization. Self-identification (and other terms implying a similar concept) has been routinely cited in many studies of radicalization; including the NYPD’s own investigation into radicalization towards terrorism. This phase reflects the manner in which users come across particular ideologies on the internet, and after gradually engaging with those systems of ideas, come to recognize themselves within the mythologized constructions of the group – and recognize themselves as a fellow member. Gradually, the individual begins to identify with the group and the group’s values and mythologies. Going beyond radical echo chambers on the fringes of the internet, this pattern of self-identification has taken a major step into the open since the arrival of Donald Trump’s particular brand of white nationalism as his rhetoric has led to many self-identifying with his messaging and has led to a global nationalist revolution.   

Luke Munn’s study on pipelines of influence and alt-right radicalization highlight three (often overlapping) cognitive phases; (1) normalization, (2) acclimation, and (3) dehumanization. 

Normalization occurs through humour and irony that packages violent and intolerant mythologies into memes and amusing pieces of internet humour. These memes are signs which signify a humourous message to a lay observer; but to an insider who participates within these particular semiotic systems, these memes are mythic signifiers that signify violent and racist signifieds. These memes normalize this type of content; on the one hand, allowing it to more easily flow in the mainstream, and on the other hand, allowing the individual to become desensitized to the disturbing nature of the rhetoric.  

Similarly, the political song “kill the boer” which had its roots in the Apartheid Era and was sung as a song of resistance is now being used to signify a different realm of meaning. One that is more subversive, conspiratorial, and potentially a pipeline to violent radicalization. The song becoming normalized in contemporary South Africa contributes to similar patterns of acclimation and resultant dehumanization.  

This repetition and normalization overlap with the second cognitive phase, acclimation. Through repetition and constant sharing, the individual becomes acclimated to this culture of violence, intolerance, and racism. According to Munn (2019), this is not a conscious affirmation by the individual, but rather the result of a gradual and progressive habituation with violent and dark rhetoric. These memes and jokes have been so endlessly shared and reshared, that the mythologies they embody – of defending culture from feminism or Islam – override and consume the violent ideas they represent.  

Brenton Tarrant turned into a meme, depicting Tarrant as a female video game character 'Tarrant-chan', murdering Muslims in the mosque. Muslims referred derogatorily to as 'kebabs'.

This leads to the Munn’s final stage, dehumanization. Here, endless repetition of these memes and their mythologies have resulted in the individual developing a cognitive bias that precludes them from recognizing the humanity in the people targeted by their rhetoric. These people are no longer human; rather, they are the constructions of the mythologies that these users engage in. These are not refugees fleeing a war-torn country; instead, these are towel-heads, ragheads, sand-n**gers, rug-lickers, terrorists, kebabs and more. All of these are the mythic constructions from repeated anti-Muslim memes that have circulated for years on platforms like 4cha, 8chan and Reddit. Brenton Tarrant was not only beatified as a Saint on these platforms, but his killing spree – which he nuanced with memes – was turned into a source for a whole range of additional memes; from memes depicting Tarrant’s spree as a video game where he earned a “high score”, to memes turning Tarrant into an anime-style character (and even a female anime character named Tarrant-chan in the Japanese ‘moe’ aesthetic style where characters are ‘cute-ified’).

Thus, myth today is exaggeratedly different from the mythologies confronting audiences in the period of Barthes’ later writings. These mythologies range from the psychographically microtargeted and individually nuanced propaganda of PR firms like Cambridge Analytica (which have only grown in sophistication since Nix’s Concordia presentation), to the echo chambers and anonymous forums where dark mythologies are nurtured and disseminated through memes and humour. Gradually acclimating the individual to their dehumanizing mythologies; and preventing the individual from de-mythologizing their beliefs and recognizing the influence of the mythology. 

References

Barthes, R. 1972. Mythologies: The Complete Edition in a New Translation. Translated by Lavers, A. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (Original work published in 1957) 

Barthes, R. 1977. Image, Music, Text. Translated from French by Heath, S. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  

Know Your Meme. 2015. Pepe the Frog. Know Your Meme. 26 March. Available: Pepe the Frog | Know Your Meme (Accessed: 12 July 2021). 

Munn, L. 2019. Alt-right pipeline: Individual journeys to extremism online. First Monday. 24(6). Available: https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v24i6.10108. (Accessed: 15 April 2022) 

Nix, A. 2016. The Power of Big Data and Audience Psychographics (Presentation). Concordia Summit. New York. September 2016. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8Dd5aVXLCc 22 January 2019.   

Wylie, C. 2019. Mindf*ck: Inside Cambridge Analytica’s Plot to Break the World. London: Profile Books.